# 02345

1968/11/18

FORM 10-67 1K-3 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

SECRET (When Filled In)

SANITIZED 7/a

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

# Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN -36354

PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS

DDI EXO

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

[redacted]

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

[redacted] 18 21 37 Nov 68 CITE [redacted] 1.3(a)(

DIST [redacted] NOVEMBER 1968

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI [redacted] 1.3(a)(

SUBJECT PRESIDENT THIEU'S COMMENTS ON PEACE TALKS IMPASSE [redacted]

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 95-31
By CG, NARA, Date 1-18-96

[redacted]

ACQ VIETNAM, SAIGON [redacted] 1.3(a)

[redacted]

SOURCE [redacted] 1.3(a)

[redacted]

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

1.3(a)

[redacted] [redacted] 1.3(a)(

(classification) (dissem controls)

SUMMARY: PRESIDENT THIEU [redacted] 1.3(a)(

[redacted] HAD BEEN SURPRISED BY THE PRESSURE EXERTED ON HIM BY THE U.S. DURING THE PRE-BOMBING HALT DISCUSSIONS. HE TERMED THE U.S. ACTION A "BETRAYAL" AND SAID VICE PRESIDENT KY FULLY SUPPORTED HIS POLICY ON THE PEACE TALKS ISSUE, INCLUDING HIS TWO-DELEGATION PROPOSAL. HE INDICATED HE MIGHT RESHUFFLE HIS CABINET IN AN EFFORT TO PLEASE THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION. [redacted] THIEU REITERATED HIS DETERMINATION NEVER TO TALK WITH NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) REPRESENTATIVES OUTSIDE OF SAIGON. THE ONLY FORMULA FOR THE PARIS TALKS HE WILL ACCEPT IS ONE WHICH REQUIRES THE NFLSV REPRESENTATIVES TO BE A PART OF THE HANOI DELEGATION. THIEU THINKS PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON WILL LET PRESIDENT JOHNSON TRY TO SOLVE THE TALKS IMPASSE SINCE A SOLUTION BY JOHNSON WOULD MAKE NIXON'S JOB AFTER INAUGURATION EASIER. 1.3(a)(4

END SUMMARY.

1. [redacted] COMMENT: OTHER INFORMATION [redacted] INDICATES THAT BY 1.3(a)(4 15 NOVEMBER PRESIDENT THIEU HAD RECOGNIZED THE NEED FOR AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE U.S. AND FOR THE REVERSAL OF THE HARD LINE ON THE PARIS PEACE TALKS THAT HE TOOK IN HIS 2 NOVEMBER

[redacted] [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

SPEECH TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY. THIS REPORT IS, THEREFORE, ALREADY OUTDATED AS AN INDICATION OF THE PRESIDENT'S POLICY ON THE PARIS TALKS. IT DOES SERVE TO SHOW, HOWEVER, THE STRENGTH OF THIEU'S RESENTMENT OVER AMERICAN POLICY AND SEVERAL OF THE MISCONCEPTIONS ON WHICH HIS OWN STAND WAS BASED. IT ALSO SHOWS THAT, AS LATE AS 11 NOVEMBER, THIEU WAS STILL ENJOYING PLAYING THE POPULAR ROLE OF DEFENDER OF VIETNAMESE NATIONAL INTERESTS.)

2. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4

[redacted] PRESIDENT NGUYEN VAN THIEU SPOKE CRITICALLY OF THE UNPRECEDENTED PRESSURE TO WHICH THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAD SUBJECTED HIM DURING THE PRE-BOMBING HALT DISCUSSIONS. ACCORDING TO THIEU, THE AMERICANS HAD CITED THE SIZE OF THE U.S. COMMITMENT IN BLOOD AND MONEY AS JUSTIFICATION FOR INSISTING THAT U.S. INTERESTS PREVAIL AND HAD CITED THE PRESENCE IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) OF A HALF MILLION U.S. TROOPS. THIEU SAID HE HAD HAD TO REMIND THE AMERICANS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CONTRIBUTION TO THE WAR WAS IN FACT, LARGER THAN THE U.S. COMMITMENT.

3. THEIU CHARACTERIZED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTION AS A

[redacted]

[redacted] 1.3(a)(4

COPY LBJ LIBRARY

"BETRAYAL" COMPARABLE TO THE U.S. ABANDONMENT OF CHIANG KAI-SHEK AS A RESULT OF THE YALTA, TEHERAN AND CASABLANCA CONFERENCES. HE COMPLAINED THAT THE AMERICANS HAD SENT THE AUSTRALIAN AND KOREAN AMBASSADORS TO BADGER HIM INTO ACCEPTING THE U.S. POINT OF VIEW. THIEU OBSERVED THAT VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN CAO KY, WHO WAS NOT PRESENT, WAS FULLY IN ACCORD WITH HIS POLICY ON THE PARIS TALKS QUESTION, INCLUDING HIS RECENTLY ENUNCIATED "OUR SIDE-YOUR SIDE" FORMULA.

4. THIEU [redacted] DURING THE U.S. ELECTION CAMPAIGN [redacted] HAD SENT TWO SECRET EMISSARIES TO THE U.S. TO CONTACT RICHARD NIXON. HE INDICATED HE MIGHT RESHUFFLE THE CABINET IN AN EFFORT TO PLEASE THE NEW U.S. ADMINISTRATION, MENTIONING SPECIFICALLY THE POSTS OF PRIME MINISTER AND FOREIGN MINISTER. 1.3(a)(4

5. THERE WAS SOME CONFIDENTIAL TALK AMONG THE PRESIDENT'S GUESTS ABOUT ORGANIZING CATHOLICS "TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT THROUGH DEMONSTRATIONS WHEN THE TIME COMES." THIEU HIMSELF REFERRED ONCE TO HIS "KNOWLEDGE" OF AMERICAN-PLANNED DEMONSTRATIONS FOR PEACE BY THE AN QUANG BUDDHIST FACTION.

6. [redacted] 1.3(a)(4)

[redacted] 1.3(a

7. [redacted] 1.3(a)(

[redacted] ASKED [redacted] TO EXPLAIN HIS "TWO-DELEGATION" FORMULA, THIEU SAID HIS IDEA WAS THAT ALL POLITICAL DISCUSSION IN PARIS SHOULD TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE GVN AND HANOI REPRESENTATIVES, ALTHOUGH THE GVN WOULD DEFER TO THE U.S. ON SUCH MATTERS AS DISPOSITION OF MILITARY BASES AND TROOPS.

8. IN RESPONSE TO ANOTHER QUESTION [redacted] 1.3(a) THIEU SAID HE WAS FIRM IN HIS DETERMINATION TO TALK ONLY WITH HANOI. HE WILL NEVER TALK DIRECTLY WITH THE NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT (NFLSV) OUTSIDE OF SVN, THIEU SAID, ALTHOUGH HE CONTINUES TO HOLD OPEN THE POSSIBILITY OF DIRECT TALKS WITH NFLSV SPOKESMEN IN SAIGON. THE OFFER OF SAFE PASSAGE TO AND FROM SUCH TALKS STILL STANDS. THIEU SAID HE HAS A PARTICULAR OBLIGATION TO OLDER PEOPLE TO KEEP UP THEIR CONFIDENCE HE WILL NEVER RECOGNIZE THE NFLSV. TALKING WITH NFLSV REPRESENTATIVES

OUTSIDE OF SAIGON WOULD AMOUNT TO SUCH RECOGNITION. HE EMPHASIZED HE WOULD WELCOME AS WITNESSES TO GVN/HANOI TALKS ALL COUNTRIES BELONGING TO THE UNITED NATIONS BUT WOULD REMAIN FIRM ON HIS STAND THAT THE ONLY FORMULA ACCEPTABLE TO HIM IS ONE WHICH REQUIRED THE NFLSV REPRESENTATIVES TO BE PART OF THE HANOI DELEGATION IN PARIS.

9. THIEU SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO REACTION FROM WASHINGTON TO HIS TWO-DELEGATION PROPOSAL SINCE THE RECENT MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRESIDENT-ELECT NIXON. HE EXPECTS NIXON TO LET JOHNSON TRY TO SOLVE THE TALKS CRISIS AND TO GO AS FAR AS POSSIBLE TOWARD REACHING A SETTLEMENT. THIS WOULD MAKE NIXON'S OWN JOB EASIER AFTER INAUGURATION AND WOULD LEAVE FOR THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION THE OBVIOUS MEASURES TO BE TAKEN TO DISENGAGE THE U.S. FROM SVN, THUS ALLOWING NIXON TO BE THE "HERO" WHO DE-AMERICANIZED THE WAR.

10. [redacted] DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR BUNKER, DEPUTY AMBASSADOR BERGER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR) USMACV (GENERAL ABRAMS, MR. COLBY, MAJOR GENERAL DAVIDSON) 7TH AIR FORCE (GENERAL BROWN) [redacted] 1.3(a)(

[redacted]



COPY LBJ LIBRARY